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Zusammenfassung 
 
Die systematische Erfassung und Aufbereitung von Daten in den Sozialwissenschaften im 
allgemeinen, in der Konflikt- und Kriegsursachenforschung im besonderen, ist nicht nur eine 
notwendige Vorbedingung für den Erkenntnisfortschritt, sondern auch Voraussetzung für die 
Verwertbarkeit in der politischen Praxis (Gewaltprävention). Das wiederum setzt voraus, 
dass die Daten den Kriterien der intersubjektiven Nachvollziehbarkeit ebenso genügen wie 
sie für die Analyse des Konfliktprozesses verwertbar sein müssen. Um den Nutzen und die 
potentiellen Schwächen der wichtigsten vorhandenen Datensätze zu gewaltsamen Konflikten 
und Kriegen zu ermitteln, werden diese einer vergleichenden Analyse unterzogen. Das Er-
gebnis ist, dass die Datensätze unterschiedliche „Welten der Gewalt“ abbilden bzw. kon-
struieren, unabhängig davon, ob sie auf qualitativen oder quantitativen operationalen Krite-
rien beruhen. Zudem bieten die meisten Datensätze keine hinreichenden Informationen für 
die Analyse der Konfliktdynamik. In der Konsequenz sollte dies dazu führen, dass die be-
grenzten Ressourcen nicht in die Entwicklung immer neuerer Datensätze investiert werden, 
sondern dass angesichts der aufgezeigten Unterschiede ein Konsens über den Gegenstand 
selbst und eine konsolidierte Datenbasis angestrebt werden. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Data making in the social sciences in general, data collection on interstate and intrastate vio-
lence in particular, is not only a necessity for the growth of knowledge but also potentially 
useful for practice. The latter is only true if the data satisfy specific criteria. As we argue for 
that latter purpose a process perspective on violence is needed given the severe limitations of 
a structural approach. Several datasets on internal and external lower and higher levels of 
violence are compared. As the results show each dataset portrays a different world of vio-
lence. It does not make a difference whether qualitative or quantitative criteria are used to 
identify violent events. Most of the datasets are limited in their use for the analysis of the 
dynamics of violence. One of the conclusions is that greater efforts should be invested in 
reaching a consensus about the data rather than spending time and money in constructing new 
datasets. 
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1. Introduction: Purposes of Data Making  
Data making in international relations research in general, conflict research in particular is not 
a terribly attractive intellectual activity. The result of this activity, however, is absolutely vital 
for the growth of knowledge. Data making and data analysis can not be looked at as exclu-
sively academic activities. If one distinguishes between basic and applied research for each of 
these activities data making and data analysis serve different purposes. The question is 
whether that distinction really applies to the social sciences in contrast say to chemistry or 
physics. This semantically irritating construct, applied basic research coined by the Social 
Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) to characterize its activities, bridges these difference. 
This distinction is plausible in: international relations offer theoretical building blocks, sys-
tematic descriptive accounts of international processes and a growing number of empirically 
grounded hypotheses, all of which contribute to the growth of knowledge. At the same time 
they offer some orientation to the various practitioners in an increasingly complex environ-
ment.  
In his introduction to Quincy Wright’s (1965) monumental Study of War Karl Deutsch 
(1965:xii) wrote that “war, to be abolished, must be understood. To be understood, it must be 
studied”. We would add: to understand war, we must analyze it. To analyze it systematically 
we need good time series. Thus, research on war (or on violence, to put it in more general 
terms), is almost by definition simultaneously relevant for academics and practitioners. For 
the latter, however, not every aspect of research is that important.  
In the analysis that follows we will argue that if research on violence or war is consid-
ered from a purely academic point of view research needs no further justification. From the 
practice point of view, however, the problem arises: knowledge for what purpose? The 
Deutsch citation defines such a purpose. Today, rather than focusing on the abolishment of 
war or violence, one would preferably speak of conflict prevention. Since the end of the Cold 
War prevention has widely been praised as the solution to the various forms of violent con-
flict by governments, international organizations and the nongovernmental sector (cf. Lund, 
1996; Väyrynen, 2000). Prevention is an attractive concept for scholars alike, due to its inte-
grative potential for a multidisciplinary approach and for some as a means to avoid conflict 
regulation with military force. 
The following analysis evaluates a variety of datasets on domestic and international vio-
lent conflict. We have now reached a stage where, once again, a rigorous assessment of what 
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we have achieved and what we have not is necessary. We will do so by first discussing the 
emergence of systematic research on international conflict. We will then discuss the structural 
versus the process orientation approach to the study of conflict and the data requirements that 
can be derived from these two alternatives in general, related to conflict prevention in particu-
lar. The empirical analysis will then compare various datasets in order to assess their degree 
of convergence. This comparative analysis includes both internal and external violent conflict 
events on the one hand, high level violence events and lower level of violence events on the 
other. Finally, some suggestions will be made for the future directions of the scientific study 
on violent conflict and assess the use of the datasets available for practical purposes.  
 
 
2. International Conflict Research 
Disregarding the ancestors of international conflict research on the study of war such as 
Richardson, Sorrokin and Wright, the first systematic dataset on international conflict respec-
tively war has been compiled by the Correlates of War Project scholars, which started some 
forty years ago under the direction of J. David Singer (cf. Singer/Small, 1972; Small/Singer, 
1982). The basic assumption was theoretically convincing: armed conflict, i.e. violent con-
flict, was conceptualized as a phenomenon in its own right. Conflict as such is, as Deutsch 
(1957) has argued elsewhere, the fundamental motor of change. Conflict is crucial for the 
integration within and between societies as long as violence is absent, thus a major productive 
force in the evolution of the relations within and between societies. If, however, violence is 
used conflict is disruptive if not destructive.1  
The Correlates of War Project, grounded in the Realpolitik paradigm, took a discipli-
nary perspective by focusing primarily at inter-state violence, i.e. war. At the time this re-
search program started no substantive justification was needed for such a research program 
even though its quantitative approach was certainly contested (and still is in some quarters). It 
was consistent with the way the bipolar international system seemed to be structured and op-
erating. The limited disciplinary perspective on the study of international conflict was equally 
unproblematic. Attempts to conduct conflict research beyond disciplinary borders, in particu-
lar the analysis of the domestic foreign conflict linkage (cf. among other Rosenau, 1980), we-
                                                 
1 Coser has developed this distinction in his study on the functions of social conflict. This does not exclude that 
major wars can be the motor of fundamental constructive international system change (cf. Holsti, 1991). 
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were not terribly successful (cf. in handbook) thereby supporting the restricted focus on the 
study of war. One of the reasons why that specific research direction did not become institu-
tionalized is probably that the gap between the theoretical problem (which was not formulated 
in a highly sophisticated manner) and the data used (mainly event interaction data for interna-
tional conflict and various domestic violence indicators from the World Handbook; cf. as an 
example Eberwein et al., 1979) was too large. 
The third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) played an important role in the 
revival of the study of war in general, the analysis of the democratic peace proposition in par-
ticular (cf. among others, Chan, 1993; Maoz, 1997). From the theoretical point of view four 
specific insights stimulated research. First, the empirical support for the democratic peace 
proposition turned out to be robust irrespective of the specific operational definitions of de-
mocracy used (cf. Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995). Second, research revealed that the transition to 
democracy is accompanied by a high incidence of international violence (Maoz/Abdolali, 
1989). Third, if the regime transition process occurs in a revolutionary fashion the new re-
gimes are more likely to get involved in violent conflicts with other nations before finally 
becoming socialized so to speak into the international community of states (ibid.). This latter 
finding made scholars aware that domestic conflict in general may not be conducive to inter-
state violence but that some type of conflict may actually lead to such an externalization proc-
ess. These - and other - findings did not disprove the prevalent Realpolitik paradigm at large 
even though the debate seemed to be framed in these terms. But these insights showed that the 
domestic setting has much greater weight than the neorealists have been willing to accept as a 
matter of fact (cf. among others Waltz, 1993).  
The collapse of Communism and Soviet hegemony contributed to broaden even further 
the theoretical framework of conflict research and international relations at large. At least 
initially the expectation seems to have been that the international system was gradually mov-
ing towards the establishment of a system of stable nation-states, towards a system of democ-
ratic states. The events in the aftermath of the breakdown of communism were indicative of 
the partial disintegration of the interstate system. This raised a whole series of complex issues 
for research due to this new trend of global fragmentation which became apparent in the dis-
solution of a number of states in conjunction with a new type of internal war (Kaldor, 1999; 
see also Holsti, 1996). Whereas the so-called classical domestic conflicts or wars, as Leader 
(2000, cf. also Jean/Rufin, 1996) argues, could be interpreted as the continuation of politics 
by other means, the new conflicts, in contrast, represent the continuation of economics by 
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other means. Violence is the means for the appropriation of resources to finance the fighting, 
but it is also the goal in terms of enrichment (cf. Berdel/Malone, 2000). This process involves 
among others private security forces, clans or mercenaries2. As Mary Kaldor (1999:93) noted: 
„regular armed forces lose their character as the legitimate bearer of arms and become in-
creasingly difficult to distinguish from private paramilitary groups. [...] The most common 
fighting units are paramilitary groups, that is to say, autonomous groups of armed men gener-
ally centered around an individual leader“. Conceptually, inter-related phenomena like the 
evolution of civil war economies and the privitization of violence are closely related to the 
structural problem of weak or failed states (see among others, Holsti, 1996). 
These new conflicts represent a challenge to international politics (state and non-state 
actors, international organizations etc.) and to the scientific discipline of international rela-
tions in general, conflict research in particular. With super power confrontation no longer 
threatening and therefore the danger of such a confrontation escalating to a nuclear exchange 
having become extremely unlikely, the more narrow disciplinary focus on interstate war was 
no longer justifiable. The same is also true with respect to the traditionally narrow focus of 
security studies (cf. Kolodziej, 1992). Environmental security (cf. among others Eber-
wein/Chojnacki, 2001) or the danger of violent conflicts over scare resources, among others 
water wars (cf. Klare, 2001; Suliman, 1999), made it on the security agenda. Equally trouble-
some to international politics were the atrocities that took place in the last decade of the 20th 
century, the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing accompanied by mass murder and torture 
on the Balkans, to give but two examples. In addition to the stability issue these events raised 
the question of the normative foundations of the international system in terms of human 
rights. Anything but clear are the implications for theories of international relations.  
The emergence and diffusion of these violent episodes raised political concerns which 
found their expression in the challenge to the non-intervention principle, among others in a 
growing number of UN Security Council resolutions concerned with domestic affairs of some 
UN member states. The justification for this fundamental change is based both on political as 
well as on normative (if not moral) arguments: on the one hand interference in domestic af-
fairs is considered to be a legitimate means for the maintenance or reestablishment of interna-
tional stability, on the other it is seen as an issue of global order in that major human rights 
                                                 
2  This trend is possibly reinforced by the new type of „corporate mercenarism“ (Aning, 2001:151-152). Unfor-
tunately, we can not go into the details in this paper. The core is the privatization of the military which states 
such as the US, the UK or France seem to be highly supportive of. 
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violations (which may not necessarily represent a threat to global stability) are no longer 
viewed as acceptable in principle. In the political domain internal and international violence 
are no longer viewed as two separate problems given the erosion of the sovereignty respec-
tively the non-interference principle in the internal affairs of another state.  
For conflict research in general, for data making in particular violence is a relevant phe-
nomenon, whether internal or external. This type of event signals the break-down of the exist-
ing domestic order which also has repercussions on the international order as well. To come 
to grips with these new issues we definitely need data on both types of events. That, however, 
requires some general notion about the theoretical foundations of conflict in general.  
 
 
 
3. Data - Theoretical and Practical Aspects 
Even if, as we argued, any dataset may be used for disciplinary or interdisciplinary as well as 
for single or multiple purposes this still requires the data on conflict to satisfy theoretically 
defined conditions. This issue will first be taken up before looking separately at several data-
sets on domestic and international conflict. 
 
3.1 Conflict Conceptualization - Implications for Data Making 
From data making in international conflict several lessons could be learned. One lesson was 
that restricting the data analysis (therefore by implication data collection) exclusively on 
events with high levels of intensity imposes severe limits on the understanding of conflict. 
Even worse, such a restriction can not be upheld on theoretical grounds. We can assume that 
high level intensity conflicts are a special class of events deserving a separate treatment. The 
problem is whether that type of conflict occurred by chance or whether it was more or less 
unavoidable given specific structural conditions. Arguing the latter way amounts to a kind of 
structural probabilism if not determinism.  
Conceptually, the disturbing problem is that whereas the structural conditions condu-
cive to war prevail most of the time wars occur only exceptionally. Lebow (2000-2001:592) 
has argued that “social scientists often assume that major social and political developments 
are specific instances of strong or weak regularities” but he thinks that the occurrence of an 
event “is always a matter of chance.” Bremer (1996) had suggested that there are multiple 
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paths to war. Both Bremer and Lebow agree that structural conditions alone can hardly ex-
plain why war breaks out. Structural explanations do at best account for the predisposition of 
nations to go to war but they can not explain the decision to wage war. The obvious reason is 
that war as the highest level of violence is the result of an ongoing interaction process among 
at least two parties. This interaction process consists of a series of discrete actions. Even if we 
postulate that each single action causes the following one there still is the problem that each 
actor is not limited to just one option. She or he always has a freedom of choice and does not 
pursue the intention to escalate per se the ongoing conflict.  
The process notion implies that wars do not necessarily start as wars in the first place. 
They begin usually at lower levels of conflict and result from the interaction process between 
at least two parties. In other words, structural conditions may predispose some nations (or 
national leaders) to use force in international politics, but other nations may actually use force 
as a consequence of the interaction dynamics of which they are part. This is what Bremer’s 
conceptualization of multiple paths to war actually suggests. The same is true for internal 
wars, meaning by this that these events are characterized by high levels of fatalities. Under 
these conditions the theoretically postulated difference between domestic and international 
politics no longer applies in that the normally hierarchically structured domestic systems 
come close to the anarchical state of affairs characterizing the international system, i. e. the 
absence of a central (and even less a legitimate ) authority. 
If this line of argument is plausible, the consequences are obvious. Analyzing conflict 
processes requires information about different escalation levels. That in turn requires a painful 
decision for data collection: how specific must the information be in order to be able, from a 
theoretical point of view, to analyze escalation processes? As the resources are limited we 
know that we cannot collect all the information we would want to. But even if we had the 
resources we might not get the information for quite a number of cases.  
This poses a dilemma because a process perspective is necessary for the study of con-
flict prevention. Prevention means manipulation or, in more neutral terms, intervention in 
ongoing conflict processes. Structural indicators alone are not suited for that purpose. Neces-
sary are indicators to describe the conflict process, i.e. specific insights about the evolution of 
specific types of behavior over time. One could argue that the greater the level of disaggrega-
tion of conflicts and the more specific their attributes the greater their value for the analysis of 
prevention and, possibly, the applicability for practical ends. The dilemma is that we may not 
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be in a position to collect such fine grained information. In addition, if the information is too 
specific, we may no longer be able to derive some meaningful generalizations. 
An equally relevant issue relates to the processes of state-building or state failure. His-
torically, if states stopped to exist this was primarily due to voluntary integration (Germany or 
Italy for example in the 19th century) or conquest. States could also cease to exist after a ma-
jor war and be recreated afterwards (such as the two Germanies after World War II). But vir-
tual statehood as embodied in the failed state concept was not thought of at all, it was at best a 
residual category. From a theoretical point of view the failed state concept possibly differs 
from the simple concept of regime transition. If such non-states are increasingly gaining in 
importance and have an impact on international order and stability, which remains to be seen 
in the years to come, then violence prevalent in failed states seems to be equally relevant for 
the study of conflict in general, international conflict in particular. The open question then is 
how to include this new category into the theoretical framework of conflict research. The 
various conceptualizations offered thus far are certainly important (cf. Holsti, 1996; Ber-
dal/Malone, 2000; Kaldor, 1999; Sarkees/Singer, 2001a, 2001b), their relevance for these new 
kinds of conflicts in contrast are less than obvious.  
Drawing the conclusions from the foregone analysis the core is that from a theoretical 
point of view the evolution of conflict is fundamentally a dynamic process. This reduces to 
the question: under what conditions is the highest level of violence reached? That begs the 
question when a violent conflict begins. This leads to two seemingly contradictory require-
ments. On the one hand, not every form of violence is relevant, that is, what are the types of 
events to be included and which ones excluded? On the other, the concept should be broad 
enough to allow for the extension of the typology so as to include at some point new types of 
events, in particular those violent conflicts that occur in failed states. Obviously, we must 
include the new kind of wars (Kaldor, 1999) or wars of the third kind (Holsti, 1996) in the era 
of globalization.  
From a theoretical point of view the answer is relatively easy: when one party threatens 
to use force or actually uses force this is taken as the benchmark for violent conflicts. This has 
been recognized for a long time by the Correlates of War Project which began to collect the 
data on Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) about three decades ago. The problem in this 
case is located at the operational level. In contrast, the concept of statehood, i.e. what an inde-
pendent state is, requires further qualification from a theoretical point of view. Sierra Leone, 
for example, is still formally an independent state, but in reality it is a non-state.  
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3.2 Bridging the Gap: Operational Issues 
Empirical research cannot logically avoid the gap between theoretical concepts and observ-
able phenomena. For that purpose operational definitions are needed as crutches. Operational 
definitions are arbitrary. They are based upon decisions. The criterion of intersubjectivity is 
the regulatory mechanism used to compensate for the definitional voluntarism. Any person 
must be able to reproduce the same dataset using the same criteria and, by logical implication, 
to reproduce thereby the results obtained by others.3 But intersubjectivity in the classical 
sense is of little help when the data collections respectively the operational definitions relate 
to different theoretical foundations. In this case the time series could still match in terms of 
the number of events recorded over time. But if this is not the case, as one would expect, we 
have a serious problem. Under these conditions we are confronted with different worlds of 
violence. This not only poses problems to the scholars but to the practitioners as well.  
The datasets on international violence to be compared use different operational defini-
tions. The theoretical assumptions differ to some extent, but it is not fully clear what  exactly 
the differences are. They all represent intra- and interstate violent events. The advantage is 
that various data sources are available which allow the scholars to define individually, for 
example, which operational measure to use for low or high levels of violence. There is, how-
ever, a price to be paid for that pluralism. Gleditsch et al. (2001:15) compared the KOSIMO, 
COW and Uppsala datasets on violent conflict. They report intercorrelations in the range of a 
low of 0.37 between COW and KOSIMO and a high of 0.65 between COW and Uppsala for 
the 1945-99 period.  
The real world is one, but the data on violent conflicts suggest different worlds of vio-
lence. This illustrates the fact that there is a problem that needs to be clarified first before a 
solution, if at all, can be found. This is the starting point for the empirical analysis that fol-
lows. The analysis is guided by to objectives: first, to establish to what extent the different 
datasets included give similar or different representations of violence in the international sys-
                                                 
3  The most extreme case social scientists can run into is the problem when no reliable data are available. The 
experience of the working group on security policy, established in the early eighties in Germany (Eber-
wein/Hörsch, 1994) provides an example for a solution of this dilemma. The issue was the East-West mili-
tary balance, nuclear and conventional. The bitter fight in politics but also among academics in conjunction 
with the Pershing-2 Missile deployment centered initially about numbers. This debate was absolutely unpro-
ductive because it distracted from the real issue, namely the potential threat due to the existing nuclear and 
conventional imbalance if it was actually highly imbalanced. This group decided to resolve the issue by con-
sensus, i.e. a consensus concerning the numbers as described by Forndran/Krell (1983:9-11). This consensus 
finally enabled the discussion to move on to the real issue, namely the threat assessment where all involved 
did start from the same data base. That a consensus was not reached on the substance, should not come as a 
surprise. But at least the debate about numbers had come to an end. 
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tem after World War II; and second, to find out whether the datasets are constructed along a 
process perspective of violence. 
 
 
3.3 Selection of the Datasets Included  
Based on the criteria discussed above, we will first describe briefly the datasets used for com-
parison. We will do so by first comparing the degree to which their representation of violent 
conflicts, nationally and internationally, match or diverge. We will then evaluate them with 
respect to the criteria mentioned. The aim was to include the most pertinent datasets presently 
available from two vantage points: their comprehensiveness and their specificity. There are 
four datasets satisfying the first criterion of comprehensiveness:  
• the Correlates of War Project datasets (including both international and intra-state 
wars as well as the “Militarized Interstate Disputes” dataset), originally directed by 
J. David Singer at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor;  
• the AKUF dataset from Hamburg, an extension and updated version of the original 
dataset collected by Istvan Kende, originally under the direction of Klaus-Jürgen 
Gantzel;  
• the KOSIMO dataset, compiled and continuously updated under the direction of 
Frank Pfetsch at the University of Heidelberg; and finally  
• the Uppsala dataset,  compiled and continuously updated under the direction of Pe-
ter Wallensteen.  
In addition, we have included a specific internal war dataset from the State Failure War Data 
collection (revolutionary and ethnic wars) where Ted Gurr has been involved. The used data-
sets are listed in Table 1 including the time span, the number of events recorded and their spe-
cific focus (type of events, violence threshold, process perspective). 
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Table 1: Used datasets of armed conflict and war 
 
Dataset Time span No. of 
events 
Type of event Violence 
threshold 
Process perspective 
COW Intra-state 
War 
1816-1997 214 Civil Wars (and 
Interventions) 
1.000 - 
COW Inter-state 
War 
1816-1997 79 Interstate War 1.000 - 
MID 1816-1992 2034 Militarized Inter-
state Dispute 
different fatality 
levels 
threats, displays, use of 
force, war 
KOSIMO (HIIK) 1945-1999 693 Conflict (no  
determination of 
internal or inter-
state disputes) 
- latent conflict, non-violent 
crisis, violent crisis, war 
AKUF 1945-1999 208 War (decolonisa-
tion, internal, 
international) 
- - 
Uppsala 1946-1999 204 Armed conflict 
(Inter-state and 
intra-state) 
25,  
1.000 
minor armed conflict  
(at least 25 deaths), 
intermediate armed 
conflict, war (at least 
1.000 deaths) 
State-Failure Wars 
 
1954-1996 110 Ethnic and revolu-
tionary war 
different fatality 
levels 
- 
 
The Correlates of War Project (COW), originally located at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, now resettled at the University of Pennsylvania under the direction of Stuart A. 
Bremer, has been the most influential research program on the scientific study of war for 
more than three decades. Conceptually, COW has generated three different datasets identify-
ing several classes of war: 1. inter-state wars, i.e. major armed conflict between two or more 
members of the international system with a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths; 2. extra-
systemic wars, defined as armed conflicts between a member of the international system and a 
political entity not recognized as a member of this inter-state system (and subdivided into 
colonial and imperial wars); 3. civil wars, defined as any armed conflict that involves military 
action internal to the metropole, the active participation of the national government, and ef-
fective resistance by both actor sides (Small/Singer, 1982:203-222). Extra-systemic and civil 
wars require a minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.  
Given the perceived conceptual weaknesses and limitations COW recently developed a 
modified and expanded typology promoting a more comprehensive analysis of the incidence 
of war (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a). More precisely, as the major alteration the COW Project has 
changed the definitions of extra-systemic wars and civil wars into “extra-state wars” (armed 
conflict between a state and a non-sovereign entity outside of the borders of the state) and 
“intra-state wars” (armed conflict within the recognized territory of the state) respectively 
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(Sarkees/Singer, 2001a:10). As a consequence, this change has resulted in the reclassification 
of a number of events formerly labelled as civil wars and extra-systemic wars. Additionally, 
the redefinition of civil wars has led to two different subsets of internal war: a) wars fought 
over the control of the government and b) wars over local issues (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a:10ff). 
Furthermore, they present the new class of “inter-communal wars” between non-state actors 
within the intra-state war category.4 This makes perfectly sense given the challenges of new 
wars, fought by diverse actors in failed states. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we 
rely only on the two updated datasets (-1997) on inter-state and intra-state wars based on the 
refined war typology; extra-systemic wars are excluded, given the political status, i.e. mem-
bership in the interstate system, as a joint operating rule guiding this comparison. 
Violent interstate incidents below the threshold of war are recorded by COW’s “Milita-
rized Interstate Dispute” (MID) dataset. A militarized interstate dispute is defined as a set of 
interactions between states involving explicit threats to resort to military force, displays of 
military force or actual uses of military force (Maoz/Gochman, 1984; Jones, Bremer and 
Singer, 1996). If a militarized confrontation between two states results in a 1,000 or more 
battle-related deaths, the dispute is classified as a war – as defined by the standard criteria of 
the COW Project (Small/Singer, 1982). Thus, operationally, the MID dataset covers four 
stages of hostile interstate interaction: (1) threat to use force, (2) display of force, (3) use of 
military force and (4) interstate war. Currently, the COW Project is updating the MID dataset 
(for details see Diehl, 2001). 
Another comprehensive research project on the scientific study of armed conflict is the 
Conflict Data Project (CDP) at Uppsala. This group collects data on internal and international 
armed conflicts. These events consist of three subsets: 1. “minor armed conflict” with at least 
25 battle-related deaths per year, but fewer than 1.000 deaths during the entire armed conflict; 
2. “intermediate armed conflict”, defined as an armed conflict with at least 25 battle-related 
deaths in a given year and more than 1.000 deaths during the whole of conflict, but fewer than 
1.000 soldiers killed in a single year; 3. the highest intensity level conflicts, i.e. war, an armed 
conflict which requires a minimum of 1.000 battle-related deaths in a single year. The Upp-
                                                 
4  The modifications made by Sarkees and Singer (2001a) have led to the classification of six types of war: 
inter-state wars (war type 1); imperial extra-state wars (war type 2), i.e. state vs. independent non-state actor; 
colonial extra-state wars  (war type 3); i.e. state vs. dependent non-state actor; intra-state wars fought for cen-
tral control (war type 4); intra-state wars fought for local issues (war type 5); inter-communal wars between 
non-state actors (war type 6).   
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sala group (in cooperation with PRIO) has recently extended the original dataset5 to cover the 
entire post-World War II period on the basis of the information found in various other major 
datasets such as COW (for details see Gleditsch et al., 2001: 3-5). The Uppsala data used in 
this analysis refer to the first version of dataset presented at the 42nd annual convention of the 
ISA in Chicago. 
While COW and CDP use quantitative criteria for the definition of violent conflicts, the 
Uppsala group differs from COW by defining armed conflicts as a “contested incompatibil-
ity” concerning government (type of political system, replacement of central governmental 
structures or change of its composition) and/or territory (demands for autonomy or secession). 
This issue-area-related coding rule leads to the awkward situation that a number of wars re-
ported by COW are missing in the Uppsala data collection - for example Jordan 1970 (a list of 
critical cases is presented by Gleditsch et al., 2000: 16). It is not fully clear why incompatibil-
ity - as a structural condition of violence – is part of the conflict definition. Conceptually, the 
definition of armed conflict is sufficiently clear, transparent and intersubjectively reproduci-
ble but also open enough to integrate any type of contested issues and new patterns of warfare 
as separate attributes. The growing number of failed states and civil war economies, for in-
stance, evokes new types of issues and new goals such as resource acquisition and enrichment 
instead of “traditional” incompatibilities concerning government (anti-regime wars) or terri-
tory (wars of autonomy or secession). Moreover, in many wars it is hard to precisely identify 
incompatibilities. 
In contrast to COW and CDP, the two German research projects AKUF and KOSIMO 
(HIIK) make use of qualitative definitions of armed conflict and war (cf. Eberwein, 1997). 
The AKUF group at the University of Hamburg for the post-World War II period defines war 
as a “violent mass conflict” between two parties or more armed forces (of which at least on 
one side regular armed forces of a particular government are involved) with a minimum of 
control and organization on both conflicting sides and a “certain durability” indicating a sys-
tematic strategy of fighting (Gantzel/Schwinghammer, 1994:31-35). This definition can lead 
to different interpretations of specific events. Furthermore, this definition complicates the 
replication of the data. A major advantage of the dataset is the  descriptive information pro-
vided for every single war, classified as anti-regime, autonomy and secession, interstate, de-
                                                 
5  Starting point for the original Uppsala dataset is 1989. The information on armed conflict is updated annually 
in the Journal of Peace Research. 
 13
colonisation or other intra-state war6. Currently, AKUF is revising its research strategy by 
considering new classes of internal violence and including forms of violent action other than 
war. Since we did not have access to the revised data we used the presently available dataset. 
As in the case of COW we exclude AKUF’s wars of decolonisation from  the analysis. 
A comprehensive dataset integrating different stages of armed conflict has been com-
piled by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) at the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg: the Conflict-Simulation-Model 
(KOSIMO). This particular project defines conflicts as clashes of overlapping interests (posi-
tional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, bor-
ders and territories, access to or distribution of domestic or international power) between at 
least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups). Similar to 
AKUF, KOSIMO uses qualitative criteria such as “some duration” and “magnitude” which 
are obviously vague and open to interpretation. The intensity of conflicts ranges from a “la-
tent conflict” and a “non-violent crisis”, to a “violent crisis” with the use of force and “war” 
(Pfetsch/Billing, 1994). In the comparison to follow, however, we excluded latent crises and 
conflicts because of the non-violent character of these types of disputes. These conflicts are 
based on unreproducible coding criteria – especially the “latent conflict” category. Since 
KOSIMO offers no precise differentiation between intrastate and interstate conflicts we have 
recoded the relevant events so that they could be used for comparative purposes (for further 
details see the methodological appendix). 
Finally, we included a specific dataset focusing on internal violence generated by the 
State Failure Task Force (Gurr/Harff, 1997; Esty et al., 1998). The State Failure Problem Set 
includes internal wars as well as data on genocides/politicides and disruptive regime transi-
tions. We have excluded the latter two datasets since they represent only subsets of domestic 
violence. Within the included war dataset the research group identifies “ethnic wars” and 
“revolutionary wars”. Revolutionary wars are defined as episodes of violent conflict between 
governments and politically organized groups seeking to overthrow the government. In con-
trast, ethnic wars are violent conflicts between governments and ethnic challengers (national, 
ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities) seeking major changes in their status 
(Gurr/Harff, 1997). Similar to both COW and CDP the State-Failure data on ethnic and revo-
                                                 
6  For the data comparison we use their integrated databank covering the wars from 1945 to 1998. The missing 
year 1999 is updated with the information found at AKUF’s web page. Unfortunately, the web site is cur-
rently only available in German and the databank function for the entire period doesn’t work; see 
http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/Ipw/Akuf/home.html. 
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lutionary use quantitatively defined thresholds of violence. In contrast to COW or CDP, how-
ever, the dataset records the number of all the people killed in a given year, not just soldiers, 
i.e. the battle-related deaths7. This makes perfectly sense because many of the civil wars 
nowadays produce overwhelmingly casualties among the civilian population. The use of this 
particular time-series may be instructive for our further understanding of violent conflict, es-
pecially for the study of new wars in weak or failed states. 
The selected datasets obviously differ more or less in their definitions and classification 
schemes, but they are appropriate for comparison purposes, since they all focus on internal 
and/or international violence and cover at least four decades of the second half of the 20th 
century.8 Excluded are, in contrast, data-gathering projects covering only a limited time span 
or focusing on very specific types of conflicts such as Holsti’s list of international wars (Hol-
sti, 1991), his data on ‘wars of the third kind’ (Holsti, 1996) or data collections based on dif-
ferent conflict concepts such as the project on international and foreign policy crises by Bre-
cher and Wilkenfeld (1997)9. Finally, we also excluded the Minorities at Risk dataset which is 
not suited for the comparison of internal conflicts, since the project focus are minorities.  
With the conceptual criteria and operational definitions in mind, we now turn to the sys-
tematic comparison of the different data sources. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7  For each war-year State-Failure presents estimates of annual fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed 
attacks and revolutionary protest (ranging from less than 100 to more than 10.000 fatalities). 
8  A more detailed explication of definitions and coding rules can be found in the methodological Appendix at 
the end of this paper. 
9  The concept of ‘crisis’ remains ambiguous. It is conceptually not fully clear whether a particular crisis is, 
strictly speaking, conflictual behavior or more a structural background condition of armed conflict and war.  
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4. Comparison of Data on Violent Conflicts10 
4.1 Interstate Armed Conflicts 
Given the destructiveness of two total wars in the 20th Century the scientific community has a 
strong interest in understanding the paths to interstate conflict. Whereas the typical interstate 
war occurs on the dyadic level (see among others Vasquez, 1993; Geller/Singer, 1998), i.e. 
between two sovereign states, some armed conflicts are characterized by the intervention of 
third parties and, therefore, escalate to multilateral wars, sometimes destabilizing the interna-
tional system at large. In general, however, there is agreement that interstate wars are, statisti-
cally speaking, relatively rare events (cf. Bremer, 1996). If the scholarly community has a 
good understanding of the war phenomenon there should be no major disagreement over this 
highest level of international violence. As a consequence the overlap between the various 
datasets should be very high. In order to test this proposition we have selected four major 
datasets all of which record interstate wars: AKUF, KOSIMO, CDP (Uppsala) and COW’s 
interstate war list. Even though each dataset covers different time periods  they all do overlap 
for several decades, i.e. between 1950 and 1997 or 1999 respectively (cf. table 1 above or the 
methodological appendix). For the comparison we use the onset of a conflict in a given year 
as our indicator.11 A further coding rule concerns the selection of cases: included are those 
events where the participants are sovereign states as defined by Correlates of War Projects 
state membership list. 
Table 2: Interstate wars, 1950-99  
(onset of war) 
 
Dataset Period Interstate 
Wars  
COW (Interstate War List) 1950-1997 21 
KOSIMO  1950-1999 22 
CDP (Uppsala) 1950-1999 22 
AKUF  1950-1999 37 
 
                                                 
10  The comparison is a revised and updated version of the paper presented at the conference ‘Identifying Wars: 
Systematic Conflict Research and its Utility in Conflict Resolution and Prevention’, 8-9 June 2001, Uppsala, 
Sweden. Included are now the modified and updated data from CDP and from the enhanced COW typology 
(Sarkees/ Singer, 2001a). Additionally, we have re-checked and corrected the other data for minor bugs. 
11  The country-year as unit of analysis (see the next section on civil wars) would inflate the numbers as that 
indicator counts the number of conflict participants. 
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Looking first at the total number of interstate wars reported by the four datasets listed in table 
2 we find that AKUF specify 37 interstate wars, the highest number of events of all four data-
sets, whereas the other research groups report only 22 interstate wars (CDP and KOSIMO) 
respectively 21 events of international warfare for  a more restricted time-span (COW). More 
precise information as to the similarities or divergencies between the datasets are found in 
table 3. In order to identify similarities and discrepancies between the major data-gathering 
projects the table lists the jointly reported events for each pair, the cases with different start 
dates, differently coded intensity levels for the same cases, different types of conflict (internal 
vs. international events) as well as the number of specific events reported only by one of 
them. The far right columnn reports the percentage of agreement for each pair, that is the 
number of joint events divided by the total events reported by both datasets.  
 
Table 3: Interstate wars 
(onset of interstate) 
 
Datasets Joint   
period 
Joint 
events 
reported 
Different 
start 
dates 
Different 
intensity 
level 
Different 
types of 
conflict 
Seperate 
events 
Total  
events 
Percent 
overlap 
AKUF - CDP 1950-99 14 1 13 5 13 46 30.4 
COW - AKUF 1950-97 15 - 15 5 5 40 37.5 
KOSIMO - CDP 1950-99 12 2 5 1 10 30 40.0 
AKUF - KOSIMO 1950-99 17 1 13 4 6 41 41.5 
COW - CDP 1950-97 13 1 8 1 4 27 48.1 
COW - KOSIMO 1950-97 14 3 3 - 4 24 58.3 
 
The degree of agreement for the joint events reported by the different pairs ranges between 
30.4 percent (AKUF and CDP), i.e. not even a third of all reported events, to nearly 60 per-
cent (COW and KOSIMO). In the remaining cases the agreement is between 37.5 and 48.1 
percent. The differences concerning the total number of events reported by the dataset pairs 
are quite large. Whereas the COW-KOSIMO pair lists 24 inter-state wars, the pair AKUF-
CDP reports almost the double, namely 46 events. Going more into details, the problem of 
different start dates for interstate wars is obviously rather small (KOSIMO has some minor 
deviations). More illuminating are the differences with respect to the intensity level of inter-
state violence and the coded types of conflict (inter-state vs. intra-state). In both columns 
AKUF is largely responsible for these discrepancies. Last not least, the high amount of cases 
listed by only one of the datasets of each pair is remarkably high. In principle, there is only 
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consensus on 11 cases for the period between 1950 and 1997 (see the list of inter-state war 
presented in the appendix).  
How can these enormous deviations be explained? One explanation is that the different 
projects use diverging operational criteria and different coding rules with respect to the high-
est level of violence (quantitative vs. qualitative definitions). The other is that the projects use 
different classification schemes for conflict and war (inter-state, intra-state, interventions, 
miscellaneous types).  
With respect to the first explanation we would expect only minor variations between the 
two projects using well defined casualty thresholds of war (COW and CDP) and greater varia-
tions between them and the other two (AKUF and KOSIMO), because the latter use “qualita-
tive” coding criteria. But as table 3 reveals we cannot find major variations between the data 
collections using qualitative and quantitative definitions. Even though COW and CDP have 
fairly stringent and explicit coding criteria, the “war world” of the Correlates of War Project 
and the Uppsala group does not match at all. Given the fact that COW and CDP use stringent 
operational criteria with a threshold of 1.000 deaths in a given year they do agree in only 48.1 
percent of the cases. In most of the remaining cases they disagree with respect to the hostility 
level. That the percentage overlap between AKUF and all other datasets remains in the range 
between 30 and 40 percent is, in contrast, less surprising. AKUF reports the highest number 
of wars and lists many cases under the threshold of war as defined by COW and CDP.  
The second explanation if not expectation is related to the different typologies of war. 
Whereas some projects classify inter-state wars as a distinct type of violence, other datasets 
do not provide a sufficient differentiation (KOSIMO) or they present a mixed war category 
including both internal and international violence such as AKUF.12 As a result of different 
typologies, some projects classify a particular event as an inter-state war, whereas others code 
them as a civil war. Critical cases are the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the Bangla-
desh war 1971 (India vs. Pakistan) or the Yemen unification war listed as an inter-state war 
by AKUF, as an intra-state war by all other projects (for further details see the list of inter-
state war presented in the appendix). In contrast to other projects the Uppsala group disaggre-
                                                 
12  In the case of AKUF we have tried to judge whether a particular war is more inter-state or more internal in its 
basic characteristics. Three wars of AKUF’s so-called conflict type ‘mixed wars’ are classified as interstate 
wars assuming that these cases start and/or escalate basically on the international level (India vs. Pakistan, 
1971; the Turkish intervention on Cyprus, 1974; and, Uganda vs. Tanzania, 1971). Another problem with 
AKUF occurs because some international wars such the Ethiopian-Somalian war in 1977 are embedded in 
the mixed category covering a wider time span and starting as internal conflicts. 
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gates, for example, the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 into three several dyadic wars (Israel vs. 
Egypt; Israel vs. Jordan, Israel vs. Syria). As a consequence, the dyadic breakdown of some 
major international conflicts inflates the degree of disagreement between the Uppsala group 
and the other data-gathering projects. 
As the comparison shows the situation concerning interstate war is problematic. There 
is agreement on several wars, but the level of disagreement concerning the level of intensity, 
the type of conflict and the inclusion or exclusion of major armed conflicts between the data-
sets is difficult to accept. What makes the situation awkward is the fact that one can not ex-
clude a priori any dataset as deficient or determine rationally one’s preference for one data 
collection over another. This is certainly true for those which offer intersubjectively repro-
ducible results, i.e. COW and CDP. 
How is the situation concerning those violent events below the threshold of war? These 
data have, as we argued above, the advantage to be used for analyzing the evolution of con-
flict. COW, Uppsala and KOSIMO code lower levels of interstate armed conflict. Such a 
process perspective is implicit in the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, 
which includes four stages of militarized disputes (threat, display, use of force, war). CDP 
presents three levels of armed conflicts (low, middle and high) and, as noted above, KOSIMO 
introduces a so-called violent crisis level (for operational definitions and coding details see 
the methodological appendix).  
In a previous paper Gleditsch et al. (2001: Figure 12) compared a subset of the interstate 
conflicts in MID (use of force) and the Uppsala disputes – limited to those events in both 
datasets with 25 or more battle deaths. While the resulting curves look virtually identical 
(with the exception of the period around the Gulf War) a closer look at the data reveals some 
striking discrepancies. Disaggregating the time series leads to different results. In table 4 we 
compare the data on the onset of serious interstate conflicts (start dates) with a threshold of 25 
deaths but lower than war (use of force in the MID dataset; minor and intermediate armed 
conflict in the CDP dataset). We have also included the ‘violent crisis’ from the KOSIMO 
dataset (not reported in the paper presented by Gleditsch et al.). 
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Table 4: Interstate armed conflicts  
(onset of interstate armed conflict) 
 
Dataset Joint 
period 
Joint events 
reported 
Separate 
events 
Total events Percent 
overlap 
COW*-CDP* 1950-92 28 63 91 30.8 
CDP*-KOSIMO 1950-99 31 59 90 34.4 
COW*-KOSIMO 1950-92 52 62 114 45.6 
* (more than 25 battle deaths, less than 1.000 battle-related deaths) 
 
As table 4 shows there are considerable discrepancies in the worlds of violent interstate con-
flict lower than war reported by the three groups. First of all, the datasets differ with respect 
to the total number of events. Whereas COW (n=84) and KOSIMO (n=83) report a similar 
amount of serious interstate conflicts, CDP lists only 38 events. Thus, the total number of 
militarized interstate disputes (COW) and violent crises (KOSIMO) is twice as high as the 
Uppsala ‘world’ of interstate armed conflict. Moreover, the percentage overlap of the differ-
ent pairs of datasets presented in table 4 is not very high. The degree of agreement lies be-
tween 30.8 percent (COW and CDP) and just 45.6 percent (COW and KOSIMO). In princi-
ple, the MID subset matches better with the violent crises events from KOSIMO than with the 
Uppsala data. But we also find that this pair reports more separate events than joint events. 
Why the discrepancies exist remains to be explained. Before drawing any further conclusions 
we will next look at the internal violence data. 
 
 
4.2 Internal Armed Conflict and War 
The end of the Cold War has led to new interaction opportunities and to changing normative 
orientations (consensus concerning minority and human rights, diffusion of democracy, ero-
sion of the non-intervention norm) in international relations on the one hand, a high amount 
of violent internal conflicts in weak or failed states (see for example Somalia, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone) on the other hand. These new risks and opportunities in international politics 
represent a major challenge to the scientific community in the field of conflict and war stud-
ies. Given the empirically observed decline of international wars and the increase in new wars 
the scientific study of internal conflict has attracted an increasing number of scholars (cf. 
among others Holsti, 1996; Kaldor, 1999). From the data making perspective the focus on 
internal conflicts is nothing new. Thus, it is no surprise at all that COW, CDP, AKUF and 
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HIIK (KOSIMO) have not only collected data on interstate armed conflicts but also on do-
mestic violence.  
In the following comparative analysis we focus, first, on the onset of intra-state war. 
Secondly, we use the incidence of armed conflict in a given year and country as our basic unit 
of analysis,  i. E. the amount of violence under way in a given year. With respect to the inci-
dence of conflict we will both look at the highest level of violence, i.e. civil war, and on do-
mestic violence below the war level. Theoretically, the incidence of armed conflict reflecting 
the duration of collective violence seems to be a crucial determinant for the study of internal 
war. Conceptually, using the country-years as our indicator allows the comparison with the 
results presented by the Uppsala group (Gleditsch et al., 2001). The basis, again, is the Corre-
lates of War state membership list. Given these specific coding rules, wars of decolonization 
were, by definition, excluded – to use the COW terms, as well as imperial and colonial wars. 
Using the country-year format for the analysis of the incidence armed conflict we have in-
cluded 6,945 nation-years for the period 1950-99. 
 
Table 5: Onset of internal wars, 1950-99  
 
Dataset Period Internal  
Wars  
KOSIMO  1950-1999 57 
CDP (Uppsala) 1950-1999 84 
COW  1950-1997 96 
AKUF  1950-1999 138 
 
With regard to the onset of domestic violence (table 5) we find that in this case, too, the dif-
ferent datasets represent different worlds of intra-state wars. The differences in internal vio-
lent conflicts reported are substantial. Whereas KOSIMO lists only 57 civil wars for the pe-
riod between 1950 and 1999, AKUF reports more than the double, namely 138 wars within 
states. COW and CDP range between these extremes with 96 and 84 internal wars respec-
tively. The relevant cases are listed in Appendix 2. 
A more detailed comparison of data on the onset of internal wars is presented in table 6. 
The table lists the jointly reported events for each pair (same start dates), cases with different 
start dates, differently coded intensity levels, and different types of conflicts as well as the 
number of specific events reported only by one of them (“separate events”). In addition, we 
have added the category “multiple wars” reflecting either additional wars due to different 
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counting (for example 1966-72 and 1978-84 instead of 1966-1984) or additional violent 
events within a given state at the same point in time.  
 
Table 6: Internal wars 1950-99 
(onset of intra-state war) 
 
Datasets Joint   
period 
Joint 
start 
dates 
Different 
start 
dates 
Different 
intensity 
level 
Different 
types 
Multiple 
wars 
Separate 
events 
Total  
events 
Percent 
overlap 
COW - AKUF 1950-97 35 36 - 4 20 61 156 22.4 
AKUF - KOSIMO 1950-99 33 15 56 1 18 23 146 22.6 
AKUF - CDP 1950-99 41 30 29 3 31 17 151 27.2 
COW - KOSIMO 1950-97 31 17 30 - 5 19 102 30.4 
KOSIMO - CDP 1950-99 30 17 29 1 6 11 94 31.9 
CDP - COW 1950-97 37 24 14 3 10 26 114 32.5 
 
Given the different operational criteria (CDP and COW vs. AKUF and KOSIMO) and the 
differentiation of armed conflicts by levels of hostility (CDP and KOSIMO), we should ex-
pect some level of agreement between similar projects, i.e. COW and CDP, greater disagree-
ment between quantitative-based and qualitative-oriented research projects. Furthermore, it 
seems to be likely to uncover discrepancies with respect to those pairs of datasets where at 
least one project takes into account different intensity levels of armed conflict. 
The results listed in table 6 show, first of all, the low degree of percentage overlap be-
tween the different pairs of datasets. As the far right column13 reveals, the range of agreement 
for the same starting points of internal wars lies between 22.4 percent for the quantitative-
qualitative pair COW-AKUF and 32.5 percent for the quantitative research groups of COW 
and Uppsala (CDP). Altogether, we find only seven identical cases reported jointly by the 
four datasets (same start years and duration) and another 12 cases with identical start years 
but different duration and/or multiple wars. Moreover, the detailed list of internal wars pre-
sented in Appendix 2 to this paper reveals three intra-state wars with different classifications 
(Hungary 1956, Cyprus 1974, Yemen 1994), 47 cases with different start years and/or differ-
ent thresholds, and, finally, 70 cases which are reported by one of the datasets only. These 
results are consistent with the prior findings on international violence and, again, the findings 
are highly troubling. 
                                                 
13  The percentage overlap for each dataset pair presented in the far right column is the number of joint events 
divided by the total of events reported by both datasets. 
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Going more into details, table 6 shows different sources accounting for the deviations 
between the pairs of datasets compared. Whereas the problem of varying classifications (in-
ternal violence vs. international wars) remains rather small and negligible, there is a signifi-
cant number of cases with different start dates. For the Tigrean liberation war in Ethiopia, for 
instance, the included data projects give four different start years: 1974 (KOSIMO), 1975 
(AKUF), 1976 (CDP) and 1978 (COW). Such variations affect the number of nation-years at 
war in the international system and the duration of wars respectively. Table 6 also confirms 
the assumption that diverse definitions and operational standards either lead to the coding of 
separate events or to the classification of intensity levels below the threshold of war. With 
respect to the latter, we find several pairs pointing to violent conflicts other than war. Obvi-
ously, ambiguities exist both within qualitative research projects (AKUF-KOSIMO) and be-
tween the qualitative and quantitative groups (KOSIMO-CDP). This points to the problem of 
vague definitions by the qualitative projects as well as to the necessity of clarifying the con-
cept of conflict stages.  
A controversial case with respect to a restricted definition is the treatment of internal 
violence in Rwanda 1994 by the Uppsala group. Since CDP (Uppsala) includes only those 
cases with a “contested incompatibility” and battle-related deaths, the massacres by Hutu and 
Tutsi are not listed as internal war, but rather as intermediate armed conflict. Controversial is 
also CDP’s exclusion of armed combat in Rwanda 1963 in contrast to COW. The argument is 
that one of the sides in the conflict is not an organized actor. In other words, the quantitative 
research projects produce also different results due to both different definitions and the inclu-
sion of intensity levels. Last but not least, a subset of critical cases is related to the problem of 
multiple coding, i.e. the fact that the projects either differ in their breakdowns of violent con-
flict or code the diversity of armed conflict in a given country at the same point in time as 
separate events. India is such an example. Whereas most of the projects list one or two cases 
of internal violence in this country during the last five decades, AKUF reports nine internal 
wars for the same period of time. Another example is the devastating period of internal vio-
lence in Bosnia-Hercegovina between 1992 and 1995. Some of the projects list two (CDP) or 
three (KOSIMO) violent conflicts, while the Correlates of War Project and AKUF report only 
one intra-state war. But this is only one of the few exceptions where COW and AKUF actu-
ally coincide. In principle, the comparison between AKUF and COW shows that there is ma-
jor disagreement in more than half of the total number of events listed. Again, this shows that 
it makes a difference which dataset is used to describe violence in the international system or 
 23
to explain it. Generally speaking, however, the actual degree of agreement between the data-
gathering projects concerning internal war events is higher than the percentages of overlap in 
the far right column of table 6 suggests. This is due to the high number of cases with different 
start dates and/or different intensity levels of domestic violence. If one disregards these dif-
ferences the overlap ranges between 65.8 (CDP-COW) percent and almost 81 percent (CDP-
KOSIMO) with the exception of the COW-AKUF pair.  
Having compared the onset of internal wars we now look at the incidence of armed con-
flict in a given year. The war-year as unit of analysis is a suitable measure for the frequency 
of violence in the international system during a pre-defined period of time. How good or bad 
is the proportion of war-years where the datasets agree and how bad is it with respect to the 
discrepancies among the various pairs? Table 7 lists the number of nation-years of war re-
ported by each pair of datasets, the number of war-years reported exclusively by the first, the 
number of war-years listed by the second dataset only, and the total number of nation-years at 
war, summing the first three columns. Finally, we have listed the proportion of jointly re-
ported high level of violence cases relative to the total number reported by each pair of data-
sets as well as the bivariate correlations. 
Table 7: Internal war-years 
(nation-years of internal war) 
 
Datasets Joint 
period 
Joint  
war- years  
First  
dataset 
only 
Second 
dataset 
only 
Total  
war-years 
Percent 
overlap 
Correlation 
coefficient 
AKUF- CDP 1950-99 351 742 24 1117 31.4 0.51 
CDP - KOSIMO 1950-99 267 108 282 657 40.6 0.56 
COW - AKUF 1950-97 476 42 560 1078 44.2 0.61 
KOSIMO - AKUF 1950-99 516 33 577 1126 45.8 0.63 
CDP - COW 1950-97 285 65 233 583 48.9 0.64 
COW - KOSIMO 1950-97 348 170 173 691 50.4 0.64 
The total numbers of war-years per dataset: AKUF (n=1093), KOSIMO (n=549), COW (n=518), CDP (n=375). 
 
The deviations among the different pairs of datasets, as one would expect by now, are consid-
erable. First of all, the total number of war-years reported by each pair is in the range of a low 
of 583 (CDP-COW) and a high of 1126 (KOSIMO-AKUF) which is almost the double. More-
over, the number of jointly reported war-years differ enormously. Within the pair of AKUF 
and KOSIMO we find 516 joint war-years, while KOSIMO and CDP agree on 267 years. 
Largely responsible for the high amount of war-years listed by several pairs is AKUF 
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reporting 1093 nation-years at war alone, while KOSIMO lists 549 war-years, the Correlates 
of War Project 518 and the Uppsala group 375 years of internal warfare in the international 
system. The best match exists between COW-KOSIMO and CDP-COW. But in both cases the 
datasets  agree in only about 50 percent, that is half of the total listed by both datasets. In con-
trast, AKUF and CDP (Uppsala) only agree in 31.4 percent of the cases. These results are also 
born out by correlation coefficients reported in the far-right column. The lowest correlation is 
between CDP and AKUF (0.51), the highest between the revised COW and KOSIMO respec-
tively COW and CDP (0.64).  
One reason for serious discrepancies between the data-gathering projects based on 
quantitative coding rules lies in the coding of periods of inactivity or lesser activity. Whereas 
COW, for example, lists a war period in Colombia from 1978 up to 1991 (14 war-years), CDP 
distinguishes between ‘intermediate armed conflict’ and ‘war’ resulting in 12 years of inter-
mediate armed conflict and only two war-years. KOSIMO, as the extreme case, lists only a 
‘violent crisis’ for Colombia and thus, no war-years at all. Furthermore, a detailed review of 
the different datasets indicates that the starting and ending dates for the same cases are not 
identical (see Appendix 2). 
As table 7 reveals the disagreement among all of the datasets is considerable which in 
itself represents a serious problem both for conflict researchers and practitioners. The world 
of internal warfare measured by the nation-years at war each dataset reports about differs con-
siderably from the other. The conclusion is that each world of domestic violence reflects the 
particular view of the data generating group. But which of the worlds reported is the real one? 
And how is the situation with respect to lower thresholds of internal violence? Whereas the 
first question remains open to further discussions and theoretical clarifications, the second one 
is addressed in the next section of this paper. 
As noted earlier, only two of the datasets included focus on armed conflicts other than 
war by capturing different intensity levels of violence. The Heidelberg Institute for Interna-
tional Conflict Research (HIIK) offers a qualitative judgement between ‘war’ and ‘violent 
crisis’ with the KOSIMO dataset. The Uppsala group (CDP) distinguishes three intensity lev-
els of collective violence: ‘minor armed conflict’, ‘intermediate armed conflict’ and ‘war’. An 
additional dataset suited for the analysis of the lower levels of violent conflict and, therefore, 
included in the comparison is the internal war dataset (revolutionary and ethnic wars) from 
the State Failure Problem Set. On the one hand, this particular dataset presents annual esti-
mates of fatalities starting with 100 deaths per year, i.e. with violent episodes below the criti-
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cal threshold of war (at least 1.000 deaths), indicating at least some similarities with the ‘con-
flict worlds’ of KOSIMO and CDP. On the other hand, however, the dataset does not list bat-
tle-related deaths only but the total number of people killed in a given year which includes 
civilian casualties. Finally, we have included, again, AKUF’s internal war data. The results 
for this general comparison of internal violent conflict-years are listed in table 8. 
As this table reveals, the percentage overlap is in the range of 51.6 percent and 67.5 
percent, the correlation coefficients are between 0.63 and 0.77. Thus, the worlds of violent 
conflict match much better than the ‘war worlds’ presented in the tables 6 and 7. The results 
are illuminating from at least three perspectives. First, the overlap of the internal war data 
reported by the State Failure Problem Set with all other datasets is not higher than 60 percent. 
 
Table 8: Internal armed conflicts  
(nation-years of conflict) 
Datasets Joint 
period 
Joint con-
flict-years 
First data-
set only 
Second 
dataset 
only  
Total con-
flict-years 
Percent 
overlap 
Correlation 
coefficient 
KOSIMO - State-Failure 1954-96 637 432 166 1235 51,6 0.63 
CDP - KOSIMO 1950-99 801 220 414 1435 55,8 0.67 
CDP - State Failure 1954-96 638 281 165 1084 58,9 0.70 
State Failure - AKUF 1954-96 669 134 321 1124 59.5 0.71 
AKUF- CDP 1950-99 851 242 170 1263 67,4 0.77 
AKUF - KOSIMO 1950-99 930 163 285 1378 67,5 0.77 
The total numbers per dataset: KOSIMO (n=1215), AKUF (n=1093), CDP (n=1021), State-Failure Wars (n=804). 
 
One possible interpretation could be that this particular dataset is not as comprehensive as the 
other datasets included. This is verified by the finding that many conflict-years reported by 
CDP and KOSIMO are not included in State Failure’s internal war data. A second interpreta-
tion is related to the opposite finding that we uncover several ethnic and revolutionary con-
flict-years not considered by other data-gathering projects. Since Ted R. Gurr and his col-
leagues from the State Failure Problem Set include civilian causalities in their definition of 
internal violence we are obviously confronted with several violent episodes other than tradi-
tional internal warfare. This is consistent with the assumption that many ‘local’ conflicts are 
increasingly characterized by the involvement of sub-state actors and by the privatization of 
violence in weak or failed states (see Kaldor, 1999, Chojnacki/Eberwein, 2000, Sarkees/ 
Singer, 2001a).  
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Second, we see AKUF’s war-years corresponding highly with the conflict-years listed 
by CDP and KOSIMO. Both pairs reach an agreement of about 67.5 percent and a correlation 
of 0.77 respectively. This is the highest correspondence to be found among the different pairs 
in the entire comparison of this paper. The reason seems to be clear: AKUF presents the wid-
est definition of war including many cases considered as lower episodes of violence by other 
projects. In other words, many wars reported by AKUF are only ‘minor’ and ‘intermediate 
armed conflicts’ (CDP) or ‘violent crises’ (KOSIMO). Moreover, we find several war-years 
neither listed as violent conflicts in CDP nor in KOSIMO. A possible explanation is that 
AKUF includes many periods of inactivity boosting the total amount of war-years. As a con-
sequence, AKUF’s list of wars is, to some degree, helpful as a supplementary survey of vio-
lence in the international system providing some important qualitative clues, but it lacks of 
reproducible standards and a process-oriented perspective.  
Third, it is still troubling that the two comprehensive datasets, KOSIMO and CDP, in-
cluding different intensity levels do agree in only 55.8 percent of the conflict-years. Most no-
tably, we find many cases (n=414) only reported by KOSIMO indicating that the vague term 
‘violent crisis’ includes either cases below the threshold of minor armed conflict (less than 25 
battle-related deaths per year) or conflict-years where violence is absent. Even though CDP 
offers more precise intensity levels, both datasets are not suited for a proper timing of the 
shifts in armed combat due to the presentation of annual aggregates only. Thus, conceptually, 
none of the datasets included is very useful for the in-depth study of the dynamics of violent 
conflicts, i.e. for a precise timing of the escalatory shifts in the different intensity levels iden-
tified. Nevertheless CDP (Uppsala), HIIK (KOSIMO) and also State Failure provide some 
information useful for that end.  
Summarizing these results for domestic violence we see that the degree of convergence 
among the datasets is unsatisfactory – particularly with respect to the high intensity level of 
war. One could conclude: the world is as violent as the dataset one uses. But we do not know 
which of the ‘war worlds’ the different datasets inform us is the correct one. Going to the 
overall category of ‘armed conflict’ the differences among most pairs of datasets, however, 
seem not to be that big suggesting that there is at least a subset of major armed disputes where 
there is agreement. 
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5. Conclusions and Implications 
At the beginning of this paper we argued that data on violence in the international system are 
crucial for two purposes: theoretically for the growth of knowledge concerning the explana-
tion of the occurrence and escalation of violence within and between states on the one hand, 
practically for contributing to the objective of conflict prevention on the other. Whereas the 
former activity does not require any further justification the latter needs to be specified. We 
will address each of this issues separately. 
The fact that several time series on internal and external violence in the international 
system are available can be interpreted as a healthy sign of the discipline. But this pluralism 
has its price. All the data portray the world of violence as it evolved over the last fifty years, 
but the worlds of violence they portray differ, in some cases even quite dramatically. This is 
the conclusion one can draw in a first cut. A closer look at the data reveals that these differ-
ences are related to different problems. The simpler issue is that there are differences in the 
coding rules, in particular with respect to the starting and end dates, with respect to the dura-
tion and the disaggregation of a specific conflict treated as a continuous one by one dataset 
into several separate conflicts by another one. That is to say that the differences among the 
various datasets are possibly less dramatic when taking these various elements into account, 
with the exception of AKUF. 
One of the striking findings is that stringent quantitative operational definitions do not 
necessarily guarantee consistency across the time series. COW and CDP disagree quite 
strongly along almost all types of violent conflicts even though they use the same operational 
criteria. Striking as well is that datasets using different operational procedures, qualitative vs. 
quantitative criteria, seem to match much better in quite a number of cases.  
Nevertheless, the problem remains that there are differences that cannot be easily ex-
plained away. The results reveal different - and in part substantially different - worlds of vio-
lence. Even if we assume that this is in part a problem of classification and measurement all 
of the datasets must obviously differ in terms of their theoretical assumptions. That is to say 
that each of them captures a particular segment of violence depending on different theoretical 
considerations about the occurrence and escalation of violent conflicts in the international 
system. Yet these different theoretical assumptions remain concealed14. 
                                                 
14  A good example for the need of both operational and theoretical considerations is found in the article just 
published by Fordham/Sarver (2001). 
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One cannot simply discard this fact and ignore this variety. A simple and pragmatic 
strategy to find out whether the discrepancies are as pronounced and relevant as we assume 
would be to test the same hypotheses using the different datasets. If the results are robust, we 
would have greater confidence in their use. If this were not the case, which we assume, there 
are two complementary alternatives. The more pragmatic approach would be to sort out the 
differences among the different data collections leading to consolidated time series of the dif-
ferent types of violence. But this strategy is limited in that it does not really address the core 
issue: what are the theoretical foundations and justifications of the individual dataset? Logi-
cally at least there is an infinite number of conflict theories. Yet scientific progress can only 
be achieved by formulating a specific theory making the underlying theoretical assumptions 
and propositions about violence explicit. At this point this is not the case. Since some of the 
data collections (CDP and KOSIMO) are characterized by more implicit theoretical designs, 
COW und AKUF, however, have tried to integrate their empirical work in a wider theoretical 
frame (Realpolitik approach vs. structural history approach). Nevertheless, even if we recog-
nize the theoretical endeavors (such in the case of AKUF), the required linkage between the-
ory and data collection remains vague or partial - to say nothing of the dubiousness concern-
ing the structural history approach.  
In the future much more weight must therefore be given to this particular dimension of 
conflict research. A research program is only progressive (Lakatos) to the extent that theories 
are developed which allow to include a greater variety of events (i.e. types or classes of 
events) than the predecessor(s).  
This is particularly true when considering the predominately state-centered categories of 
armed conflict. These are inappropriate for the study of “new” types of internal war. Of 
course, sovereign states still remain the most important actors in international politics. But if 
the patterns of armed conflict are changing and if new sets of actors (clans, gangs, security 
companies etc.) are gaining in importance, then we need additional categories of war includ-
ing conflicts in failed states between non-state actors within and across borders. For these 
purposes, COW’s revised typology of war is a step in the right direction (Sarkees/Singer, 
2001a). In any case, we need an expansion of our existing typologies opening space for new 
types of conflict including armed combat other than war and some information about civilian 
casualties (cf. Smith, 2001). 
This still does not answer a central aspect of conflict research: the issue of escalation 
and de-escalation of violence. To study the evolution of violence requires the ability to trace 
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the dynamics of the whole process. Both COW with the MID-data and CDP with its own time 
series identify different levels of intensity. At this point in time this is definitely not enough. 
The information is still limited (four respectively three levels of intensity) and one gets only 
the highest level of violence reached, which tells us not terribly much about the dynamics of 
that process. The Behavioral Correlates of War could be the solution for this particular prob-
lem. But we suspect that such a time consuming and high cost undertaking can hardly be pur-
sued continuously (ignoring the fact that one also needs people willing to do such a painstak-
ing job). Yet this means that at least from the systematic research perspective there are limits 
as to the contribution to the overall issue of conflict prevention.  
This brings us to the final issue namely what can conflict research contribute to practice 
in general, to conflict prevention in particular? Ironical as it may sound, these differences 
among the datasets seem to support a constructivist perspective which tends to see reality as 
constructed by the observer. To use a modified version of Alex Wendt’s (1989) famous 
statement about the social construction of international anarchy: ‘the state (world) of violence 
is what researchers make of it’. This statement fundamentally contradicts the underlying logic 
of quantitative research which is predicated upon the assumption that reality exists and that 
intersubjectivity is essential. The discrepancies among the datasets compared seem to support 
an arbitrary perspective akin to Feyerabend’s “anything goes” statement. The consequential 
problem the scholars have is one of credibility. As we cannot expect practitioners to know or - 
even if they do - to care about operational criteria or theoretical subtleties they can either sim-
ply ignore what research has produced or pick the dataset on the menu of choice we offer 
them. An alarmist type would probably pick the dataset with the highest numbers, whereas an 
appeasement type would prefer the time series with the lowest numbers of wars. And we 
could not even blame the one or the other. 
Leaving this issue aside, what can we contribute to the prevention of violent conflicts? 
Systematic research on violent conflict has a lot of insights to contribute to the outbreak of 
violence (see among others, Holsti, 1991, 1996; Vasquez, 1993; Geller, 1998). Therefore, we 
are in a position to provide practice – if one wants to – with some advice pertaining to this 
particular dimension of prevention. But even if one does that one still has to be cautious in not 
overselling the findings given the problematic state of affairs on the data side. As far as the 
prevention of conflict escalation is concerned we are probably still in the state of infancy for 
two reasons: first, the data available do not give us good representations of the conflict dy-
namics and second there is the data problem which our analysis revealed.  
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Our arguments may sound extremely destructive. They are not! On the contrary. Con-
flict research in general, quantitative research on inter-state and on intra-state violence in par-
ticular, has come a long way. Considerable progress has been achieved. But we can still do – 
and must do - better. 
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6. Appendix 1: Definitions, Coding Rules and Sources 
 
 
The operational definitions and coding rules of armed conflict and war of the data projects 
included are described below. 
  
Correlates of War Project (COW) 
For our comparison we use COW’s expanded data on intra-state and inter-state war based on 
the broadened typology of war (Sarkees/Singer, 2001a; 2001b). Excluded are extra-state wars 
involving armed combat between a territorial state and a non-sovereign entity outside the bor-
ders of the state. The definitions for inter-state and intra-state wars are as follows: 
Inter-state wars: sustained armed combat between two or more state members of the in-
ternational system with a threshold of a total of 1.000 battle-related fatalities (COW’s 
war type 1); 
Intra-state (civil) wars: sustained combat between the armed forces of the government 
and forces of another entity with a threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths per year 
(COW’s war types 4 and 5). 
Time span: 1816-1997 
COW’s inter-state war list is available online (http://pss.la.psu.edu/ISWarFormat.htm). The 
revised civil war dataset has been made available by Meredith Sarkees. 
 
For interstate violence below the threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths, i.e. international 
war, we refer on COW’s “Militarized Interstate Dispute” (MID) dataset. MID’s refer to 
“united historical cases in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by 
one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, offi-
cial forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones et al., 1996:168). Whereas threats to 
use force are verbal indications of hostile intent, displays of force involve military demonstra-
tions but no combat action. Uses of force – the highest of the three sub-war categories – are 
defined as active military operations below the threshold of 1.000 battle-related deaths, i.e. 
interstate war.  
Time span: 1816-1992  
Version 2.1 of the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset is available online (http://pss.la.psu. 
edu/MID_DATA.HTM); the MID 3 Project is dedicated to the updating the MID dataset 
through 2001 (see http://mid3.la.psu.edu/)  
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Uppsala Conflict Data Project (CDP) 
Definition of Armed Conflict: An Armed Conflict is a contested incompatibility which con-
cerns government (type of political system, replacement of the central government or change 
of its composition) and/or territory (change of the state in control of a certain territory, seces-
sion or autonomy) where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is 
the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. The separated intensity 
levels are operationalized as follows: 
minor armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1.000 bat-
tle-related deaths during the course of conflict; 
intermediate armed conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumu-
lated total of at least 1.000, but fewer than 1.000 per year; 
war: at least 1.000 battle-related deaths per year. 
Types of Conflict: intrastate armed conflict; interstate armed conflict 
Time span: 1946-2000 (annually updated) 
The Uppsala data used in this analysis refer to the first version of dataset presented at the 42nd 
annual convention of the ISA in Chicago 
 
 
Hamburger Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF) 
Definition of War: A War is defined as a violent mass conflict, satisfying the following three 
criteria: 
first, two or more armed forces are involved in the fighting, where at least one of them 
is a regular armed force of a government in power (military, police, paramilitary 
forces);  
second, both sides show a minimum of centrally directed organization of the battles 
even if this means only organised defence or strategically planned attacks; and 
third, the armed operations show a certain degree of continuity and are not simply spon-
taneous, occasional confrontations, the actors involved are acting according to a recog-
nisable strategy. 
Types of War: internal war (anti-regime wars, autonomy and secession, other intra-state); in-
ter-state war; mixed war (internal and inter-state) – in cases of mixed wars we have tried to 
judge whether a particular war is more inter-state or more internal in its basic characteristics 
Time span: 1945-2000 (annually updated) 
For the data comparison we use their integrated databank covering the wars from 1945 to 
1998. The missing year 1999 is updated with the information found at AKUF’s web page. 
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Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIK, KOSIMO dataset) 
Definition of conflict: HIIK’s starting point is the term “conflict” defining clashes of overlap-
ping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-
determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international 
power); a conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, 
groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their inter-
ests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state. Possible instruments used in 
the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, threat, pressure, passive or 
active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. The KOSIMO dataset contains 
both non-violent (latent conflict, crisis) and violent conflicts. For comparison purposes we 
rely only on the violent conflict data defined as follows: 
Severe crisis: sporadic, irregular use of force, ‘war-in-sight’ crisis 
War: systematic, collective use of force by regular troops 
Type of Conflict: inter-state, intra-state and internationalized conflicts; since the KOSIMO 
dataset provides sometimes no adequate information on the type of conflict (inter-state vs. 
intra-state), we had to recode the various cases for the comparison. 
Time span: 1945-2000 (annually updated)  
Basis for the comparison is the KOSIMO-Database (1945-99) which is available online at 
http://www.hiik.de/en/kosimo/kosimo_download.htm 
 
 
Internal wars (Gurr/Harff) 
The State Failure Task Force distinguishes four types of state failures: Revolutionary War, 
Ethnic War, Regime Transition, and Genocide/Politicide. For the purposes of this analysis, 
we subsume the two war types (ethnic and revolutionary) to the ‘internal war’ category. Re-
gime Transitions and Genocide/Politicide are, in contrast, excluded since they represent only 
sub-classes of armed conflict. 
Internal wars: episodes of violent conflict between the government and politically or-
ganized groups (revolutionary wars) and/or episodes of violent conflict between gov-
ernments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic wars); 
the minimum thresholds for including ethnic and revolutionary wars in the updated state 
failure problem set are that each party must mobilize 1.000 or more people (armed 
agents, demonstrators, troops) and an average of 100 or more fatalities per year must 
occur during the episode.  
Time span: 1954-96 
The data on internal wars and failures of governance compiled by the “State Failure Task 
Force” are available online (http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail/) 
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7. Appendix 2: List of Inter-state and Intra-state Wars 
 
 
Annotation:  
a) The year-dates printed in a prevalent fashion point to the periods of international or in-
ternal warfare. If a particular conflict contains two or more periods of activity, this has 
been marked by numbering the conflicts (see, for instance, the Kurdish revolts in Iraq). 
b) Since CDP and KOSIMO present armed conflicts by level on annual estimates, we have 
fixed the war periods for these datasets consisting of continuous war-years, but possibly 
interrupted by ‘intermediate armed conflict’ (CDP) or ‘violent crisis’ (KOSIMO). 
Longer periods of inactivity (including minor conflicts), however, lead to the coding of 
multiple wars. 
c) Conflicts identified by CDP and KOSIMO never reaching the threshold of war as well 
as other deviations presented by one of the datasets included (different classifications 
etc) are set cursive and/or in brackets. 
 
 
 
a) Inter-state wars (sorted by type of agreement and arranged in alphabetical order) 
 COW CDP AKUF KOSIMO 
a) identical start year and 
duration 
    
Argentina-United Kingdom 
(Falklands) 
1982 1982 1982 1982 
Egypt-Israel  (Six-Days-War) 1967 1967 1967 1967 
Egypt-Israel (Yom Kippur) 1973 1973 1973 1973 
Eritrea-Ethiopia missing 1998-99 1998 1998-99 
Iran-Iraq 1980-88 1980-88 1980-88 1980-88 
Israel, England, France-Egypt 
(Suez) 
1956 1956 1956 1956 
North Korea-South Korea 1950-53 1950-53 1950-53 1950-53 
b) identical start year/ 
different duration 
    
China-DR Vietnam 1979 1979 1979-88 1979 
China-India (Assam) 1962 1962 1962 1962-63 
El Salvador-Honduras 1969 1969 1969 1969-70 
India-Pakistan (Second Kash-
mir) 
1965 1965 1965 1965-70 
c) different classification 
(internal vs. external) 
    
India-Pakistan 1971 1971 1971 (mixed war) 1971 
North Yemen-South Yemen  
(70-days-war) 
1994 
(internal) 
1994 
(internal) 
1994 
 
1994 
(internal) 
Soviet Union-Hungary 
 
1956 
 
1956 
 
1956 
(internal) 
1956-57 (internal, 
violent crisis) 
Turkey-Cyprus  
(Turkish Invasion) 
1974 
 
1974 
(internal) 
1974 
(mixed war) 
1974 
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 COW CDP AKUF KOSIMO 
d) different start year and/or 
threshold 
    
AR Yemen-PR Jemen 
 
1971-72 
(use of force) 
1972 (minor) 
 
1972 
 
1972 
(violent crisis) 
Burkina Faso-Mali 
 
1985-86 
(use of force) 
1985 (minor) 
 
1985 
 
1985 
(violent crisis) 
Cambodia-Vietnam 
 
1975-79 
 
1975-77 
(minor) 
1975- 
 
1977-78 
 
Ecuador-Peru (Amazonas) missing 1995 (minor) 1995 1995 
Gulf War (Iraq-Kuwait, Anti-Iraq 
Coalition) 
1990-91 
 
1991 
 
1990 (1); 
1991 (2) 
1990-91 
 
India-Pakistan  
(Siachen-glacier) 
 
1984, 1985 
(use of force) 
 
1984, 1987, 
1989-90  
(intermediate) 
1984-89 
 
 
1984-91 
(violent crisis) 
 
India-Pakistan 
 
missing 1999 1999 1988-99 
(violent crisis) 
Indonesia-Netherlands  
(West-Irian) 
1960-62 
(use of force) 
1962 
(minor) 
1962 
 
1960-69 
(violent crisis) 
Israel-Egypt 
 
1969-70 
 
1969-70 
(intermediate) 
1969-70 
 
1967-73 
(violent crisis) 
Malaysia-Indonesia 
 
1963-65 
(use of force) 
1963-66 
(minor) 
1963-66 
 
1963-66 
 
Morocco-Algeria (Tindouf) 1963 (use of force) 1963 (minor) 1963-64 1963 (violent crisis) 
Panama-United States  
 
1989 
(use of force) 
1989 
(minor) 
1989 1989-90 
(violent crisis) 
South Vietnam-North Vietnam 
 
1965-75 
 
1965-75 
 
1957-75 
(mixed war) 
1964-73 
 
Tunisia-France  
(Bizerte) 
1961 
(use of force) 
1961 
 
1961 
 
1961-63 
(violent crisis) 
United States-Grenada 1983 (use of force) 1983 (minor) 1983 1983 (violent crisis) 
e) missing wars in one or 
more datasets (and other 
deviations) 
    
Afghanistan-Soviet Union  
(intervention) 
 1979-88 
 
internal, part of war 
No. 141 
coded as internal, 
KOSIMO No. 1 
Chad-Libya  
(Aozou strip) 
1986-87 (use of 
force) 
1987 
 
  
China-DR Vietnam 
 
1987 1986-88 
(intermediate) 
  
Ecuador-Peru (Amazonas) 1981 (use of force)  1981 1981 (1), 1981 (2) 
Ethiopia-Somalia 
 
1977-78 
 
 1975-84 
(mixed war) 
1976-78 
 
India-Pakistan  
(Rann of Kutch) 
1965 
(use of force) 
 1965 
 
1965-99 
(violent crisis) 
Iraq-United States missing  1998  
Israel-Jordan (West Bank) 1967-70 
(use of force) 
1967 
 
  
Israel-Syria  
(Golan Heights) 
1973-74 (use of 
force) 
1973 
 
  
Israel-Syria (Golan Heights) 1967 (use of force) 1967   
Israel-Syria (Lebanon) 1982    
Laos-Thailand 
 
1987-88 
(use of force) 
1986-88 
(minor) 
1987-88 
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 COW CDP AKUF KOSIMO 
PR Yemen-Saudi Arabia 1969 (use of force)  1969  
Slovenia-Yugoslavia  
(Independence) 
 1991 
(minor, internal) 
1991 
 
 
Spain-Morocco 
 
1957-58 
(use of force) 
 1957-58 
 
1957-58 
(violent crisis) 
Uganda-Tanzania  
(Kagera Salient I) 
1971 
(use of force) 
 1971 
(mixed war) 
1972 
(violent crisis) 
Uganda-Tanzania 1978-79  1978-79 1978-79 
 
 
 
b) Intra-state wars (sorted by type of agreement and arranged in alphabetical order) 
 COW CDP AKUF KOSIMO 
a) identical start year and  
duration 
    
Congo-Brazzaville (UDF) 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (CDR) missing 1998-99 1998-99 1998-99 
Guinea-Bissau missing 1998-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1998-99 1998-99 
Nigeria (Biafra) 1967-70 1967-70 1967-70 1967-70 
Sri Lanka (Tamils) 1983-97 1983-84 (minor), 
1985-99 (war and 
intermediate 
1983-99 1983-99 
Sudan (South Sudan, SPLM) 1983-97 1983-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1983-99 1983-99 
Yemen, Peoples Rep. (Leftists 
Faction) 
1986 1986 1986 1986 
b) identical start year/  
different duration 
    
Bosnia-Hercegovina (Serbian 
Rebellion) 
1992-95 1992-95 (war and 
intermediate) 
1992-95 1992-94 
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Kabila-
ADFL) 
1996-97 1996 (minor), 1997 1996-97 1996-98 
Indonesia (South Moluccas) 1950 1950 1950 1950-65 
Iraq (Kurdish) 1961-63 (1);  
1974-75 (2);  
1985-93 (3);  
1996 (4) 
1961-70 (war and 
intermediate); 
1973-93 (war and 
intermediate) 
1961-64 (1) ;  
1965-66 (2) ;  
1969-70 (3);  
1974-75 (4);  
1976- (5) 
1961-70 (1); 
1974-75 (violent 
crisis) (2); 1979-86 
(violent crisis (3); 
1991- (violent cri-
sis) (4) 
Laos II (Second Laotian, Pathet 
Lao) 
1963-73 1963-73 1963-73 1963-75 
Lebanon (Various Organiza-
tions) 
1975-90 1975 (minor), 1976-
90 (war and inter-
mediate) 
1975-99 1975-97 (war and 
violent crisis) (1); 
1988-90 (2) 
Liberia 1989-90 (1); 1992-
95 (2); 1996 (3) 
1989 (minor), 1990-
95 (war and inter-
mediate); 1996 
(minor) 
1989-96 1989-95 
Rwanda 1990-93 (1); 
1994 (2) 
1990 (minor), 1991-
94 (war and inter-
mediate) 
1990-99 1990-94 
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 COW CDP AKUF KOSIMO 
Sierra Leone (RUF) 1991-96 1991-93 (minor), 
1994-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1991-99 1991-99 
Tajikistan (Popular Democratic 
Army) 
1992-97 1992-96 (war and 
intermediate) 
1992-97 1992-99 (war and 
violent crisis) 
Yemen, Arab. Rep. (Royalists 
North Yemen) 
1962-69 1962-70 (war and 
intermediate) 
1962-69 1962-68 
Yugoslavia (Croatian Indepen-
dence) 
1991-92 1991 1991-95 1991-95 
c) different classification  
(internal vs. external) 
    
Cyprus (Turkish Intervention) 1974 (interstate) 1974 1974 (mixed) 1974 (interstate) 
Hungary 1956 (interstate) 1956 (interstate) 1956 1956-57  
(violent crisis) 
Yemen (South Yemeni Seces-
sionist) 
1994 1994 1994  
(interstate) 
1994 
d) different start year and/or 
thresholds 
    
Afghanistan 1978-92 1978-99 1978-99 1978-79 (violent 
crisis), 1979-99 
Algeria  
(Islamic Rebels) 
1992-97 1992 (minor), 1993-
99 
1992-99 1992-99 (violent 
crisis) 
Angola  
(UNITA) 
1975-91 (1); 
1992-94 (2) 
1975-95 (1); 
1998-99 (2) 
1961-99 1975-91 (1); 1992-
94 (violent crisis), 
1997-99 (2) 
Azerbaijan (Nagorno-
Karabakh) 
1991-94 1992-94 1990-94 1991-94 
Bolivia  
(Leftists) 
1952 1951 (minor) 1946-52 1946-52  
(violent crisis) 
Burundi  
(Hutu Rebels) 
1993-97 1995-96 (minor), 
1997-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1994-99 1993-99 
Cambodia I  
(Khmer Rouge) 
1970-75 1967-69 (war and 
intermediate) (1); 
1970-75 (2) 
1968-75 1970-75 
Cambodia II  
(FUNK, Khmer Rouge) 
1978-91 (1);  
1993-97 (2) 
1978-98 (war and 
intermediate) 
1975-98 1978-91; 1991-99 
(violent crisis) 
Chad  
(Frolinat Rebellion) 
1966-71 (1); 1980-
88 (2) 
1965-90 (war and 
intermediate) 
1966-99 1966-80 (1);  
1983-90 (2) 
China (Tibetans) 1956-59 1956 (1), 1959 (2) 1954-59 1954-59 
Colombia  
(M-19 & Drug Lords) 
1984-97 1965-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1964-99 (1);  
1965-99 (2);  
1974-90 (3) 
1964-72 (violent 
crisis); 1978-99 
(violent crisis) (1); 
1989-99 (war and 
violent crisis) (2) 
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire (Ka-
tanga & Leftists) 
1960-65 1960-62 (minor) 
(1); 1964-65 (2) 
1960-63 (1); 1964-
66 (2) 
1960-63 (1);  
1964-65 (violent 
crisis)(2) 
Cuba (Cuban Revolution) 1958-59 1957 (minor), 1958 1956-59 1956-59 
Dominican Republic 1965 1965 (minor) 1965 1965 (violent crisis) 
El Salvador  
(Salvadorean Democratic 
Front) 
1979-92 1979-80 (minor), 
1981-91 (war and 
intermediate) 
1981-92 1981-92 
Ethiopia  
(Eritrean) 
1974-91 1962-67 (minor), 
1968-91 war and 
intermediate) 
1962-91 1961-67  
(violent crisis), 
1967-93 
Ethiopia  
(Ogaden, Somali Rebels) 
1976-77 1976 (minor), 1977-
83 (war and inter-
mediate) 
1963-64 (1); 
1975-84 (2) 
1978-88  
(violent crisis) 
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Ethiopia (Tigrean Liberation) 1978-91 1976-91 1975-91 1974-91 
Georgia  
(Gamsakurdia) 
1991-94 1991-93 (minor) 1991-93 1989-99 (violent 
crisis) 
Guatemala 1966-72 (1);  
1970-71 (2);  
1978-84 (3) 
1966-67 (minor), 
1968-95 (war and 
intermediate) 
1962-68 (1);  
1980-97 (2) 
1960-72 (1);  
1980-93 (2) 
Guatemala (Conservative) 1954 1954 (minor) 1954 1954 (violent crisis) 
India  
(Various) 
1985-97 1947-99 (war and 
intermediate); 
1983-86 (minor, 
Punjab),  
1987-93 (war and 
intermediate,  
Punjab) 
1954-64 (Nagas I); 
1966-80 (Mizos); 
1969-75 (Nagas II); 
1982-99 (Punjab); 
1990-99 (Assam); 
1990-99 (Kashmir); 
1997-99  
(Naxalites);  
1997-99 (Bodos); 
1999 (Tripura) 
1947-69 (violent 
crisis, various); 
1981-99 (violent 
crisis; Punjab) 
Indonesia  
(East Timor) 
1976-79 1975-89 (war and 
intermediate); 
1992, 1997-98 
(intermediate) 
1975-94 1974-99 
Iran  
(Kurdish Autonomy) 
 1979-88 (war and 
intermediate) 
1979-88 1979-88  
(violent crisis) 
Laos I  
(First Laotian, Pathet Lao) 
1960-62 1959-61 1959-61 1953-61  
(violent (crisis) 
Lebanon (Leftists) 1958 1958 1958 1958 (violent crisis) 
Mozambique  
(Renano) 
1979-92 1976-80 (minor), 
1981-92 
1975-92 1978-94 
Myanmar  
(Various Groups) 
1968-80 (1);  
1983-95 (2) 
1948-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1948-99 1948-99 
Nicaragua I (Revolution) 1978-79 1978-79 1977-79 1977-79 
Nicaragua II  
(Contra War) 
1982-90 1981-82 (minor), 
1983-89 (war and 
intermediate) 
1981-90 1981-90 
Pakistan  
(Baluchistan, Baluchi Rebels) 
1973-77 1974-77 (war and 
intermediate) 
1973-77 1973-76 (violent 
crisis) 
Pakistan (East Pakistan) 1971 1971 1971 (mixed war) 1971 (violent crisis) 
Peru  
(Shining Path) 
1982-95 1980 (minor), 1981-
99 (war and inter-
mediate) 
1980-98 (1);  
1987-94 (2) 
1980-96 
Philippines  
(Huks) 
1950-52 1946-51 1946-54 1945-54  
(violent crisis) 
Philippines  
(Mindanao) 
1972-80 1970-71 (minor), 
1972-88 (war and 
intermediate) 
1970-99 1970-99  
(violent crisis) 
Philippines  
(NPA) 
1972-92 1972-80 (minor), 
1981-94 (war and 
intermediate) 
1970-96 1968-99 (violent 
crisis) 
Rumania  
(Anti-Ceaucescu Rebels) 
1989 1989 (minor) 1989 1989-91  
(violent crisis) 
Russia  
(Chechnya Secessionists) 
1994-96 1994 (minor), 1995-
96 (1);  
1999 (2) 
1994-96 (1);  
1999 (2) 
1991-99 
Somalia  
(Clan Faction) 
1982-97 1981-86 (minor), 
1987-96 (war and 
intermediate) 
1988-99 1988-99 
South Vietnam (North Vietnam, 
FNL) 
1960-65 1955-64 1957-75 1955-76 (1);  
1960-61 (2) 
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Sri Lanka  
(Janatha Vimukthi- JVP) 
1971 1971 1971 1971  
(violent crisis) 
Sudan  
(South Sudan, Anya Nya) 
1963-72 1963-72 1955-72 1955-63 (1); 1963-
72 (2) 
Thailand  
(Communist Insurgency) 
1970-73 1974-82 (interme-
diate) 
1965-80 1965-80 (violent 
crisis) 
Turkey  
(Kurds) 
1991-97 1984-86 (minor), 
1987-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
1984-99 1984-89  
(violent crisis),  
1989-99 (war and 
violent crisis) 
Uganda  
(Military Faction) 
1980-88 1979 (1); 1981-88 
(2); 1989-91 (war 
and intermediate) 
(3) 
1981-92 1981-86 (violent 
crisis) 
Yugoslavia  
(Kosovo) 
missing 1998-99 1998-99 1997-99  
(war and violent 
crisis) 
Zimbabwe  
(Rhodesia, Patriotic Front) 
1972-79 1972-75 (minor), 
1976-79 
1966-79 1972-79 
e) missing wars in one or 
more datasets (and other 
deviations)  
    
Algeria  
(Former Rebel Leaders) 
1962-63 1962  
(intermediate) 
  
Argentina (Army) 1955 1955 (minor)   
Argentina  
(Montoneros) 
 1973-74 (minor), 
1975-77 (war and 
intermediate) 
1968-77 1969-77 
Bangladesh (Chittagong)  1975-92 (minor and 
intermediate) 
1973-92 1975-87  
(violent crisis) 
Bosnia-Hercegovina (Croatian 
Rep. Of Bosnia-Hercegovina) 
 1993-94 (war and 
intermediate) 
Part of AKUF 
No. 211 
1992-94 
Bosnia-Hercegovina  
(re-conquest of Krajina) 
   1995 
Burundi (Hutu) 1972  1972-73 1972-73 
Burundi (Hutu) 1988   1988 
Burundi (Tutsi Supremacists) 1991 1990-92 (minor)   
Chile (Coup, Pichochet) 1973 1973 (minor)   
China  
(Cultural Revolution, Red 
Guard) 
1967-68   1969  
(violent crisis) 
China (Kuomintang)  1953   
Congo-Brazzaville  
(Opposition Militias) 
missing 1998-99 1998-99  
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire  
(Rebels) 
1993   1991-99  
(violent crisis) 
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire  
(Mercenaries) 
 1967  
(minor) 
1967 1966-67  
(violent crisis) 
Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire  
(Shaba) 
 1977-78 (minor and 
intermediate) 
1977 (1);  
1978 (2) 
1977-78  
(violent crisis) 
Costa Rica (Coup)   1955  
Croatia (re-conquest of Kraji-
na/Westslavonia) 
 1992-93, 1995 
(intermediate) 
Part of AKUF  
No. 200 
1995 
Cuba  
(Bay of Pigs) 
 1961  
(minor) 
1961 1961  
(violent crisis) 
Cyprus    1963-64 1963-64  
(violent crisis) 
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Dem. Rep. of Vietnam 
(FULRO) 
  1964-92  
Djibouti  1991-94  
(minor) 
1991-94 1991-94  
(violent crisis) 
Ethiopia  
(Oromo) 
 1999  
(minor) 
1976-94 1977-91  
(violent crisis) 
France   1961-62   
Georgia  
(South Ossetia) 
 1992  
(minor) 
1990-92 1989-99  
(violent crisis) 
Georgia (Abkhazia)  1992 (minor),  
1993 (war) 
1992-94 1989-99  
(violent crisis) 
Indonesia  
(Darul Islam)  
1953 1953  1947-91  
(violent crisis) 
Indonesia  
(Leftists) 
1956-60 1958-61  
(intermediate) 
1958-61 1955-58  
(violent crisis) 
Indonesia  
(Papua) 
 1976-78 1965-99 1960-82  
(violent crisis) 
Indonesia  
(Aceh) 
 1989 (minor), 1990-
91 (war and inter-
mediate);  
1999 (minor) 
1990-93 (1);  
1999 (2) 
1990-99  
(violent crisis) 
Iran  
(Anti-Shah-Koalition, Mujahid-
din) 
1978-79 (1);  
1981-82 (2) 
1979-80 (minor), 
1981-82 
 1978-83  
(violent crisis) 
Iraq  
(Shammar Tribe) 
1959 1959 (minor)  1958-59  
(violent crisis) 
Iraq  
(Shiites) 
 1991-96 (war and 
intermediate) 
1991-96 1991-99  
(violent crisis) 
Israel (PLO, Hamas)  1970-99  
(intermediate) 
1968-93 1987-93  
(violent crisis) 
Jordan  
(Black September, Palestini-
ans) 
1970  1970-71 1970-71  
(violent crisis) 
Kenya  
(Shifta) 
  1963-67 1965-67  
(violent crisis) 
Kyrgyzstan missing  1999  
Laos (Meo)   1975-79 (1);  
1990-92 (2) 
 
Mali  
(Tuareg) 
 1990, 1994 (minor) Part of AKUF  
No. 197 
1990-99  
(violent crisis) 
Mexico (Chiapas)  1994 (minor) 1994-95 1994-99  
(violent crisis) 
Moldova (Dniestr)  1992 (minor) 1992  
Morocco  
(Mauretania) 
(extra-state,  
1975-83) 
1975-89 (war and 
intermediate) 
1975-91 1976-91  
(violent crisis) 
Nepal  1960-62  
(minor) 
1950-51 (1);  
1962 (2) 
1959-61  
(violent crisis) 
Nepal (UPF) missing 1997-99 (minor) 1999 1998-99  
(violent crisis) 
Niger  
(Tuareg) 
 1990-92, 1994, 
1997 (minor) 
1990-96 1990-95  
(violent crisis) 
Nigeria  
(Muslim fundamentalists) 
1980-81 (1);  
1984 (2) 
 1980  
Nigeria (MOSOP) missing  1999 1993-99  
(violent crisis) 
Nigeria (TIV)   1964  
Pakistan (Mohajir) 1994-95 1995-96 (minor)   
Pakistan (Sind)   1988-96  
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Papua New Guinea  
(Bougainville) 
 1989-90, 1992-96 
(minor) 
1989-99 1988-99  
(violent crisis) 
Peru (MIR)  1965-66  
(minor) 
1965-66 1965-66  
(violent crisis) 
Russia (Ingushia)   1992-94  
Rwanda 1963-64  1963-66 1963-64  
(violent crisis) 
Rwanda  1998-99 (war and 
intermediate) 
Part of AKUF  
No. 189 
1994-99  
(violent crisis) 
Senegal  
(Casamance) 
 1990, 1992-93, 
1995, 1997-99 
(minor) 
1990-99 1982-99  
(violent crisis) 
South Africa  
(Namibia) 
(extra-state,  
1975-88) 
1966-78 (minor), 
1979-88 (war and 
intermediate) 
1966-88 1966-90  
(violent crisis) 
South Africa  
(Apartheid) 
 1981-88 (minor), 
1989-93 
1976-94 1976-94 
(violent crisis) 
Spain (ETA)  1980-81, 1987, 
1991-92 (minor) 
1968-79 1960-99  
(violent crisis) 
Sri Lanka  
(Janatha Vimukthi- JVP) 
1987-89 1989-90 (war and 
intermediate) 
Part of AKUF  
No. 157 
Part of KOSIMO 
No. 243 
Surinam   1986-88 (minor) 1986-89 1986-92  
(violent crisis) 
Syria  1979-81 (minor), 
1982 
1982 1982  
(violent crisis) 
Uganda 1966    
Uganda  
(Lords Resistance Army) 
1996-97 1996-99  
(intermediate) 
1995-99  
United Kingdom  
(Northern Ireland) 
 1971-93 (minor and 
intermediate) 
1969-94 1968-99  
(violent crisis) 
Venezuela  
(Military Faction) 
 1962  
(minor) 
1963-67 1960-69  
(violent crisis) 
Yemen, Arab. Rep.   1980-82 (minor) 1978-82 1978-79 (violent 
crisis) 
Yemen, Peoples Rep.   1968 1968-73  
(violent crisis) 
Zambia (Mushala)   1976-82  
Zimbabwe (Matabele)   1983-88 1983 (violent crisis) 
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